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legacies including even specific devises and will not be resorted to first.8 There
must, however, be a valid existing legal obligation at the time of the testator's
death.9 A general legacy in discharge of a moral obligation, or as compensa-
tion for services or for favors rendered gratuitously, is not entitled to a
preference over the other devises or legacies.10
The best example of this exception to the generk.l rule are legacies given:
first, in consideration for the discharge of a debt to a creditor;"1 and second,
in lieu of a widow's right of dower. As to the first, it is apparent from the
decisions that it is not accepted quite as readily as consideration, as is the
waiver of a widow of her dower right in consideration for her right to take
under the testator's will. Some courts contend that such a legatee takes only
on the bounty of the testator and not as a purchaser for value.' 3
By the great weight of authority, a general legacy in lieu of dower being
in consideration of an existing legal right, constitutes the widow as a pur-
chaser for value,14 and for that reason is entitled to a priority over all legacies
and specific devises to volunteers of the testator's bounty.15 This is true even
though the will does not specificiaIly provide that the gift is in lieu of dower.16
However, this exception does not apply where the intention of the testator
clearly shows such gift should not have a preference over other bequests.17
This question is one of first impression in Indiana1 8 but the court has
adhered to the majority viewpoint. F. L. M.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-FUNCTIONAL AND NONFUNCTIONAL PARTS-Plaintiff
filed a complaint asking for a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining
defendant from manufacturing or selling its electric shaver with its present
8 Borden v. Jenks (1886), 140 Mass. 562, 5 N. E. 623, 54 Am. Rep. 507: "A
pecuniary legacy to the testator's widow accepted by her, must be paid not only
in preference to general legacies, but if the abatement of those proves insufficient
in preference, first to specific bequests, and second to specific devises."
9 34 A. L. R. Note p. 1288; Pomeroy, J. N., Eq. Juris. 4th Ed., Vol. 3, See.
1142: "A general legacy given for a valuable consideration . . . does not abate
with the other legacies, provided the dower right or the debt still exists at the
testator's death."
lODuncaff v. Franklin Twp. (1887), 43 N. J. Eq. 143, 10 A. 546; but in
Matthew v. Targorna (1906), 104 Md. 442, 65 A. 60, 10 Am. Cas. 153, it was
held, "that a legacy to one whose right to recover for the death of the testator
is barred by the Statute of Limitations is entitled to priority on the theory that
the legatee is a purchaser."
l134 A. L. R. Note p. 1285; Reynolds v. Reynolds (1906), 27 R. I. 520, 63 A.
804.
12 Pope et al. v. Pope et al. (1911), 209 Mass. 432, 95 N. E. 864.
13 Wedmore v. Wedmore (1907), 2 Ch. (Engl.) 277, 2 B. R. C. 502; Re
Rispin (1914), 35 Got. L. Rep. 385, 27 D. L. R. 574; 34 A. L. R. Note p. 1285.
1434 A. L. R Note p. 1276; Lord v. Lord (1854), 23 Conn. 327; Pope v.
Pope et al. Note 14 supra; EImery v. Batchor (1886), 78 Me. 233, 2 A. 733
(dictum).
15 Note 9, supra.
16 Note 13, supra.
17 Note 8, supra.
18 First National Bank Exr. v. Hessong (1925), 83 Ind. App. 531, 149 N. E.
190 (dictum). The court in this case stated the general rule but held it did not
apply, since the testator's intent was that all general legacies should abate
pro rata.
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round head. Plaintiff had been making and advertising its shaver, featuring
its "round shaving head" for about eighteen months before defendant started
making one with a similar head. Plaintiff alleges that the round head has
become associated with plaintiff and its product in the mind of the public.
Held, for plaintiff, injunction granted. A manufacturer has a right to make
any unpatented article embodying necessary functional parts so that the whole
will function; but he cannot incorporate what is merely ornamental or peculiar
to another's product. The sole question is whether nonfunctional elements have
been embodied with a misleading of the public. Here defendant had un-
necessarily imitated the plaintiff's shaver head in nonfunctional features.1
Unfair competition ordinarily consists in simulation by one person, for the
purpose of deceiving the public, of the name, symbols, form, or devices em-
ployed- by a business rival, or the substitution of the goods and wares of one
person for those of another, thus.inducing the purchase of his wares.2 The
doctrine of unfair competition is based on the proposition that no one shall by
imitation or unfair device induce the public to believe that the goods he offers
for sale are the goods of another, and thus appropriate to himself the value of
the reputation which the other has acquired for his own product and mer-
chandise.8 An exclusive proprietary interest such as a trade mark or copy-
right is not essential to maintenance of a suit for injunction or recovery of
damages, but an interest in the good will is sufficient, because it is the prop-
erty in the good will and reputation which is protected, and that property right
will be protected the same as any other property right.4
Unfair competition is to be tested by whether trade is being unfairly inter-
fered with and the public cheated into buying something which it in fact is
not getting.5 When the resemblance between the two products is such that the
ordinary buyer, under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the conduct
of the particular traffic to which the controversy relates, is deceived, or might
be deceived, the courts will interfere to protect the plaintiff and the public.6
It is not necessary to show that any particular person was actually deceived by
1Electro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp. (1937), 19 F. Supp. 843.
2 Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 455, 104
N. E. 34-; Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co. v. Utah Independent Tel. Co. (1906),
31 Utah 377, 88 P. 26; Ralston Purina Co. v. Checker Food Products Co. (Mo.,
1935), 80 S. W. (2d) 717; Avnet v. Texas Centennial Central Exposition
(Texas, 1936), 96 S. W. (2d) 685.
SFuller v. Huff (1900), 104 F. 141; Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister
Machine Co. (1916), 63 Ind. App. 412, 112 N. E. 906.
4 State v. Hagen (1892), 6 Ind. App. 167, 33 N. E. 223; Computing Cheese
Cutter Co. v. Dunn (1909), 45 Ind. App. 20, 88 N. E. 93; Hartzler v. Goshen
Churn & Ladder Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 455, 104 N. E. 34; Howard Dust-
less Duster Co. v. Carleton (1915), 219 F. 913; Carter Transfer & Storage Co.
v. Carter (1921), 106 Neb. 531, 184 N. W. 113; Elgin National Watch Co. v.
Illinois Watch Co. (1901), 179 U. S. 665, 21 S. Ct. 270.
5 W. & H. Walker, Inc. v. Walker Bros. Co. (1921), 271 F. 395.
6 Fischer v. Blank (1893), 138 N. Y. 244, 33 N. E. 1040; Lever Bros. Co. v.
J. Eavenson & Sons '(1935), 283 N. Y. S. 398, 157 Misc. 297; Oakite Products,
Inc. v. Boritz (1936), 293 N. Y. S. 399, 161 Misc. 807. In Deister Concentrator
Co. v. Deister Machine Co. (1916), 63 Ind. App. 412, 11? N. E. 906, the court
stated that the class of persons who buy the particular kind of article manu-
factured, such as servants or children on the one hand, or persons skilled in a
particular trade upon the other, must be considered in determining the ques-
tion of probable deception.
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defendant's conduct and led to buy his goods in the belief they were the goods
of the plaintiff; it is sufficient to show that such deception will be the natural
and probable result.7 Thus in the principal case, it was not necessary to show
anyone was actually misled, but only that it would be the probable result.
There are three lines of authority as to the necessity that fraudulent intent
be present, to the effect: (a) fraudulent intent is a necessary ingredient of
unfair competition,S (b) circumstances must be made out that will show wrong-
ful intent, or justify that inference from the consequences of the act complained
of,9 (c) fraudulent intent is not necessary, and unfair competition may exist
even in the presence of good faith.1O It would seem that the last rule, followed
in Indiana and in the principal case, is much the best, as the property interest
to be protected is the same regardless of whether a fraudulent intent is present
or not.
In regard to unfair competition as limited to the copying of form or shape,
of which the principal case is an example, the courts have started with the
assumption that one person has as much of an inherent right to make an
unpatented article as any other person may have. However, a person can copy
in nonfunctional parts only so long as that nonfunctional part has not become
associated in the public mind with its manufacturer or source, this association
often being termed "secondary meaning."1 1 It is the contention of the plaintiff
in the noted case that its round shaver head has gained this secondary meaning.
Any person entering a field already occupied does so with a duty to dis-
tinguish his article from that of the original manufacturer, where the original
has a secondary meaning, so that the ordinary buyer will not be misled.1 2
Mere priority of invention by itself does not entitle any person to a monopoly
in that field, nor is the mere copying of a prior design unfair competition.18
7 Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 455, 104
N. E. 34; Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister Machine Co. (1916), 63, Ind. App.
412, 112 N. E. 906; Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. National Aluminum
Works (1915), 226 F. 815; Miller Rubber Co. v. Behrend (1917), 242 F. 515;
P. B. Davis Co. v. Davis (1935), 11 F. Supp. 269.
8W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn Shoe Co. (1905), 100 Me. 461, 62 A. 499;
Queen Manufacturing Co. v. Isaac Ginsburg & Bros., Inc. (1928), 25 F. (2d)
284; Coca Cola Co. v. Loft, Inc. (1935), 19 Del. Ch. 292, 167 A. 900.
9 Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Tennessee Manufacturing Co. (1890),
138 U. S. 537, 11 S. Ct. 396; Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co.
(1901), 179 U. S. 665, 21 S. Ct. 270.
10 Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 455, 104-
N. E. 34; Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister Machine Co. (1916), 63 Ind.
App. 412, 112 N. E. 906; Boston Shoe Shop v. McBroom Shoe Shop (1916),
196 Ala. 567, 72 So. 102; Nesne v. Sundet (1904), 93 Minn. 299, 101 N. W. 490;
Fairyfoot Products Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1935), 80 F. (2d) 684.
11 Rymer v. Anchor Stove & Range Co. (1934), 70 F. (2d) 386; A. C.
Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz (1930), 45 F. (2d) 98; Le Mur Co. v. W. G. Shelton
Co. (1929), 32 F. (2d) 79; Trico Products Corp. v. Ace Products Corp. (1929),
30 F. (2d) 688; Upjohn Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co. (1920), 269 F.
209; J. A. Scriven Co. v. Morris (1907), 154 F. 914; Crescent Tool Co. v.
Kilborn & Bishop Co. (1917), 247 F. 299.
12 Lever Bros. Co. v. J. Eavenson & Sons (1935), 283 N. Y. S. 398, 157 Misc.
297; Art Metal Works v. Cunningham Products Corp. (1930), 242 N. Y. S.
294, 137 Misc. 429; Moline Plow Co. v. Omaha Iron Store Co. (1916), 235
F. 519.
13 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co. (1916), 233 F. 112.
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Functional features not patented, or on which the patent has expired, can be
copied, but nonfunctional features such as size, dress, contours, and appear-
ance can not be copied where it will result in misleading the public.1 4 In
Marvel u. Pearl,1 5 the court states, "In the absence of protection by patent, no
person can monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion of other elements of
mechanical construction which are essential to the successful practical operation
of a manufacturer, or which primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the
purpose to which it is devoted." The other side of the statement given above
seems to be that no person can copy nonfunctional parts of another's product
when such nonfunctional part has become associated with the source of the
product. However, mere similarity of form, dimensions, or general appearance
can not establish unfair competition, especially where it results from an effort
to comply with the physical requirements essential to commercial success.1 6
Nor does simulation amounting to unfair competition reside in identity of
single features, but is to be tested by the general impression made by the
offending article upon the ordinary purchaser.l7 Thus, in the principal case, if
the ordinary purchaser upon seeing defendant's shaver by itself would gain the
impression that it was plaintiff's shaver, that was all that was necessary.
There seems to be one exception to the rule forbidding an absolute copying,
as it seems to be permissible where both products are a copy of another article.
Following this exception, the maker of toy balloons in the likeness of water-
melon was allowed to enter the field when it was already occupied.' 8 On the
same theory, the manufacture of a toy telephone-shaped bottle containing candy
was permitted.19 In such case, the copy is not a copy of the competitor's article,
but a copy of the original thing itself, and the courts refuse to give one manu-
facturer a monopoly merely because he was the first in the field.
Unfair competition has been hard to establish when the article is one of
simple form. In the case of McGhee v. LeSage & Co.,20 where plaintiff was
losing its drapery hook business to defendant because of aggressive salesman-
ship, the court said there was no logical reason why plaintiff should not meet
defendants on their own ground, by manufacturing and selling a device identi-
cal in appearance. The reason may be that in such simple things almost every
part is functional, and therefore can be copied. 2 1
14 Art Metal Works v. Cunningham Products Corp. (1930), 283 N. Y. S. 398,
137 Misc. 429; McGill Manufacturing Co. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co.
1(1930), 43 F. (2d) 607; Le Mur Co. v. W. G. Shelton Co. (1929), 32 F. (2d)
79; Rushmore v. Badger Brass Manufacturing Co. (1912), 198 F. 379.
15 Marvel Co. v. Pearl (1904), 133 F. 160.
16Kawneer Co. v. McHugh (1931), 51 F. (2d) 560; Rushmore v. Man-
hattan Screw & Stamping Works (1908), 163 F. 939; Globe-Wernicke Co. v.
Fred Macey Co. (1902), 119 F. 696; John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Manufactur-
ing Co. (1913), 202 F. 155.
17 Chesebrough Manufacturing Co. v. Old Gold Chemical, Co. (1934), 70 F.
(2d) 383.
18 Miller Rubber Co. v. Behrend (1917), 242 F. 515.
19 John J. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Manufacturing Co. (1913), 202 F. 155.
20 McGhee v. LeSage & Co. (1929), 32 F. (2d) 875.
21 A. C. Gilbert v. Shemitz (1930), 45 F. (2d) 98, in which the court stated
that the elements of a fruit juice extractor were so functional that nothing
short of a clear danger of confusion would justify modification of the model in
any way, is another example of copying of a simple object.
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The doctrine of unfair competition is still growing. In Indiana, cases of
unfair competition are few, but there is one outstanding case, Hartzler V. The
Goshen Churn & Ladder Co.,22 in which the court stated that unfair competition
had not been much considered by the Indiana courts, so the court set out the
general principles of the law of unfair competition, and the same have never
been overruled. R. K. R.
22 Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co. (1914), 55 Ind. App. 455, 104
N. E. 34.
